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THE 9/11 REFORM ACT: EXAMINING 
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE HUMAN 
SMUGGLING AND TRAFFICKING CENTER 
Wednesday, March 8, 2006
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY, 
SUBCOMMITTEE ON MANAGEMENT, 
INTEGRATION AND OVERSIGHT, 
Washington, DC. 
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:30 p.m., in Room 
311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Mike Rogers [chairman 
of the subcommittee] presiding. 
Present: Representatives Rogers, Harris, Reichert, Meek, Jack-
son-Lee, and Pascrell. 
Mr. ROGERS. The Subcommittee on Management, Integration and 
Oversight will come to order. Today we are holding a hearing to 
discuss the Human Smuggling and Trafficking Center. This facility 
was established by the 9/11 Reform Act and is designed to combat 
terrorist travel. Let me begin by welcoming our panel of guests to 
this hearing. 
Also I want to recognize our colleague from Florida, Ms. Harris, 
who has been a leader in addressing problems associated with 
human trafficking. 
The 9/11 Commission correctly pointed out that before September 
11, 2001, no U.S. Government agency systemically analyzed terror-
ists’ travel strategies. The 9/11 Commission also believed if the 
Federal Government had done so, we could have discovered how 
terrorist predecessors to al-Qa’ida exploited the weaknesses in our 
border security. 
As a result, and based on the Commission’s recommendation, the 
Committee on Homeland Security, along with the Committee on 
International Relations, pushed for the terrorist travel provisions 
in the 9/11 Reform Act. 
Through the Act, Congress directed the Departments of Justice, 
State and Homeland Security to address the problem of terrorist 
travel, including human smuggling and trafficking, in a com-
prehensive way. The result was the Human Smuggling and Traf-
ficking Center. 
We look forward to hearing about the effectiveness of the Center 
today, as well as challenges to this interagency effort. 
I now yield to our Ranking Member, Mr. Meek, from Florida for 
any statement he may have. 
2Mr. MEEK. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to not 
only thank you and Ms. Harris but also our witnesses for being a 
part of this discussion today. I know our time is limited on this 
hearing, so I am going to make my opening comments very brief. 
Mr. Chairman, as you know, this is a major issue to our country. 
And as we start looking at protecting our borders and also pro-
tecting those individuals that are victims of smugglers and others 
that are out there, that is our biggest challenge. I know that this 
office is one of the offices that we are going to be talking about 
today, is only staffed with 12 individuals to deal with the whole 
country on this subject. I am looking forward to hearing from all 
of our witnesses here today on how we can accomplish that and if 
they are getting full cooperation from other Federal agencies to 
combat human smuggling and also cutting down on trafficking or 
possible terrorist travel. 
So with that, Mr. Chairman, I would yield back the balance of 
my time so that hopefully we can get to these witnesses. 
Mr. ROGERS. I now recognize the Gentlelady from Florida for any 
opening statement she may have. 
Ms. HARRIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and good afternoon. I 
wish to express my gratitude to you, Mr. Chairman, for granting 
my request to bring this important issue out of the shadows and 
into a public forum, and I also want to thank all our witnesses 
today on both panels for their contributions to the subcommittee’s 
examination of the implementation status of one of the key provi-
sions outlined in the 9/11 Reform Act, the Terrorist Travel and 
Human Smuggling and Trafficking Center. 
We are here today in order to determine the extent to which this 
interagency effort is meeting the statutory intent of the law. The 
Committee on Homeland Security was instrumental in ensuring 
the inclusion of these terrorist travel provisions in the 9/11 Reform 
Act, including section 7202, which would authorize the Human 
Smuggling and Trafficking Center. 
The exercise of this committee’s oversight responsibilities de-
mand that we ascertain whether the current staff structure, the 
funding levels and the overall strategy are sufficient to ensure com-
pliance with the statutorily defined mission of the Center. And if 
not, we must resolve to identify and address any of these 
insufficiencies. 
Today, the integrity of our immigration system and our Nation’s 
security is comprised of three increasingly pervasive threats: Clan-
destine terrorist travel, sex trafficking and human smuggling. 
These criminal acts may be a distinct phenomenon, but they share 
a number of unique characteristics, and it is essential that we first 
understand the subtle differences between the crimes. 
The crime of clandestine terrorist travel acts involves surrep-
titious movements of the terrorists by means of fraudulent docu-
mentation or alias support of a terrorist operation, often with the 
help of illicit travel networks, which can either be terrorist or 
criminal networks. 
The sex trafficking involves the exploitation of people through 
force, coercion, threats, or deception, and includes human rights 
abuses such as debt bondage, deprivation of liberty or lack of con-
trol over their freedom and labor. 
3Trafficking can be for purposes of sexual exploitation or labor ex-
ploitation and accordingly the INS estimates that the trafficking of 
human beings, including sex trafficking, exceeds $10 billion in the 
global industry that now compromises the third largest source of 
money for organized crime after drugs and arms. 
Human smuggling, on the other hand, is defined as the facilita-
tion, transportation or attempted transportation or illegal entry of 
persons across an international border in violation of one or more 
of the country’s laws. In many cases, individuals engaged in human 
smuggling do so willingly and voluntarily. 
The conditions which give rise to terrorist travel, sex trafficking 
and human smuggling, as well as the modes, methods and means 
of transportation are often similar. The absence of moral conscience 
and willingness to engage in these unspeakable acts of brutality is 
evident in the terrorists and traffickers alike. 
In Florida the threat is a particular concern because of our 
State’s designation as one of the top three destination States with-
in the U.S. for trafficking of victims. 
Florida’s demographics are a large number of immigrants and 
the presence of 12 international airports, 14 deep water seaports 
and our significant water borders that make our State particularly 
attractive to traffickers and terrorists. 
The grave nature of this threat was acknowledged in the 9/11 
Commission’s report on August 2004 in the recommendations. And 
in response to the Commission’s proposals, Congress passed the In-
telligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act of 2004, also called 
the 9/11 Reform Act. Many of the provisions were designed to 
eradicate the institutional weaknesses that led to the Government’s 
failure to adequately protect our Nation from terrorist attack and 
in particular for its failure to, quote, connect the dots. 
The terrorist exploitation of our transportation and immigration 
system galvanized the Commission’s focus on the need to combat 
terrorism by targeting terrorist travel. The Commission rec-
ommended, and I quote, targeting travel is at least as powerful a 
weapon against terrorists as targeting their money. The United 
States should combine terrorist travel intelligence operations and 
law enforcement into a strategy to intercept terrorists, find ter-
rorist travel facilitators, and constrain terrorists’ mobility, end 
quote. 
The Center constituted an integral component of an overall strat-
egy to combat all violations of our immigration system, and as as-
serted in the Center’s charter, quote, migrant smuggling, traf-
ficking in persons and clandestine terrorist travel are transnational 
issues that threaten national security. They also raise significant 
human rights and rule of law concerns. 
Finally, there is no ambiguity in the law with regard to this cen-
ter’s function. Section 7202 clearly states that the primary function 
of the Center is that it shall serve as the focal point for the inter-
agency efforts to address terrorist travel. 
And today I wish to clarify that Congress’ intent was for the Fed-
eral Government to address the problem of terrorist travel, includ-
ing the ancillary crimes of human smuggling and sex trafficking, 
in a coordinated and comprehensive way. The subsequent meetings 
held by the committee with the staffs of the 9/11 Commission of the 
4Human Smuggling and Trafficking Center, the Center’s significant 
potential to play a key roll in combating terrorist travel emerged. 
It is for this reason that the Committee on Homeland Security, 
along with International Relations Committee pushed for the statu-
tory authorization of the Human Smuggling and Trafficking Cen-
ter. However, I am concerned by the reports that this Center lacks 
sufficient resources, including a dedicated full-time staff, dedicated 
management, and dedicated appropriations needed for the Center’s 
fulfilling of the legislative intent. 
In a time of limited resources, it is incumbent upon Members of 
Congress to ask each agency the tough questions, how does your 
agency envision the future of the Center, is the Center adequately 
staffed, funded and organized in order to fulfill its mission, does it 
have the appropriate leadership involved, and what obstacles exist 
to the Center’s receiving full support? 
Again, I wish to thank the witnesses for appearing today, and I 
look forward to hearing their testimony. I now yield back to the 
ranking member for any opening statement that he may have. 
Mr. ROGERS. I want to thank the witnesses. We have a very dis-
tinguished panel with us now. We thank you for being here. And 
I want to let you know your entire statements will be submitted 
for the record in their entirety. But I would ask so that we can get 
to the questions that you limit your comments to 5 minutes. 
We are going be called for votes at about 3:30. We would like to 
wrap this up so we don’t keep you waiting here for an hour while 
we are over there voting. 
So with that, the Chair now recognizes Mr. John Clark, Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of Immigration and Customs Enforcement of 
the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, for any statement he 
may have. 
STATEMENT OF JOHN CLARK, DEPUTY ASSISTANT 
SECRETARY, IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, 
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 
Mr. CLARK. Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Meek and dis-
tinguished members of the subcommittee, it is an honor for me to 
appear before you today to share the Department of Homeland Se-
curity’s role in the implementation of the Human Smuggling and 
Trafficking Center and the Department’s commitment to its critical 
mission. 
I would like to stray a little from my written statement in giving 
my oral summary. I have two reasons for doing so. The first is I 
want to more concretely underscore the strong relationship Depart-
ment of Homeland Security is developing with the Human Smug-
gling and Trafficking Center. It is a relationship that is maturing 
and growing as the Center and Department move beyond our first 
years of existence. 
The second reason is not to wave the flag of immigration and 
customs enforcement, or ICE, but as an executive of ICE to also 
underscore a part of the reason as to why I am appearing before 
you today representing the Department of Homeland Security at 
this hearing. 
The mission of the Center marries very well into part of the core 
mission of ICE. My agency has the primary Federal responsibility 
5for investigating transnational organizations responsible for human 
smuggling and trafficking. The Center provides a venue in which 
various agencies within DHS, but principally ICE, can share all in-
formation on these organizations, classified or otherwise, and work 
collaboratively with our partners in DOJ, State and the Intel-
ligence Community to ensure that criminal organizations involved 
in human smuggling and trafficking aren’t also connected with ter-
rorism. 
Should we identify any such links, we are able to seamlessly 
hand off to the FBI, the agency with primary jurisdiction for such 
terrorist related investigations. There is currently no other center 
that provides such a venue. 
From the perspective of the Department, the Center has been 
providing strategic operational and tactical information as well as 
analytic support, which has supported ICE smuggling investiga-
tions, human smuggling investigations, and have resulted in the 
disruption and/or dismantling of criminal travel networks engaged 
in the movement of foreign nationals of special interest to the 
United States. 
I would like to summarize some of these contributions, with the 
understanding that some of the locations have been generalized 
due to the ongoing nature of the investigation and the nature that 
the Center supports us. 
For example, the Center provided valuable support for an ICE in-
vestigation conducted by one of our field offices in the northeastern 
United States that focused on a travel network engaged in the 
smuggling of Indian nationals through the Caribbean and South 
America. The investigation disclosed that these smugglers had en-
gaged in the illegal movement of special interest aliens. Both smug-
glers were indicted and are in U.S. custody at this time. 
In a recent event, a flagless fishing vessel transporting over 100 
migrants capsized in the Pacific Ocean off the coast of South Amer-
ica while en route to Central America. This Center rapidly pro-
vided tactical information to ICE investigators and DOJ officials 
who deployed to South America to assist the host government in 
the ensuing criminal investigation. The collaborative efforts of both 
governments led to the arrest by the foreign authorities of the 
smuggler responsible for the tragedy. 
During an ICE human smuggling investigation, the Center pro-
vided intelligence information that was shared with the foreign 
government. The foreign government detained the ICE suspect in 
accordance with international law. The detention of the subject al-
lowed both the United States and the foreign government to use 
the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized 
Crime, specifically the Protocol Against the Smuggling of Migrants, 
for the first time for both countries in making extradition to the 
United States legally possible. The extradition has been granted, 
although it is still pending an appeal by the subject in that coun-
try. 
The subject was identified as a member of a criminal organiza-
tion engaged in the smuggling of Albanian and Macedonian nation-
als. This criminal organization procured fraudulent travel docu-
ments to facilitate the movement of foreign nationals through Eu-
6rope and South America with the United States as the ultimate 
destination. 
ICE has unparalleled experience investigating organizations in 
both human smuggling and trafficking of persons. In fiscal years 
2004, 2005 ICE human smuggling and trafficking investigations re-
sulted in approximately 4,000 arrests, 2,000 indictments, and more 
than 1,500 convictions. As it pertains to significant travel net-
works, ICE engages in multiagency intelligence driven targeting. 
As a result of these U.S. Government targeting efforts, ICE-led 
investigations have resulted in the disruption and/or dismantling of 
24 signify criminal travel networks engaged in the global move-
ment of third country nationals, mostly foreign nationals of coun-
tries of interest to the United States. 
In their similar initiative abroad, the U.S. Ambassador to Mexico 
requested that the U.S. Embassy’s Fusion Center be renamed the 
Alien Smuggling Coordination Center, ASCC, with a refocused mis-
sion on human smuggling travel patterns of third country nation-
als. The Ambassador requested that ICE assume the U.S. govern-
ment lead for the operational responsibilities of the new ASCC. 
To that end, ICE has allocated manpower, inclusive of a des-
ignated agent to coordinate the implementation of the ASCC and 
to collaborate with all U.S. Government stakeholders at post. The 
ASCC is intended to operate in the U.S. Embassy in Mexico along 
similar lines of the HSTC by bringing representatives from Law 
Enforcement and Intelligence and State to share and review data 
on human smuggling and trafficking organizations looking for any 
connections with terrorism and enhanced enforcement actions as 
appropriate. 
As it relates to trafficking in persons, ICE has an unprecedented 
role in preventing the revictimization of trafficking victims through 
the issuance of short-term immigration relief in the form of contin-
ued presence. Although there are several government entities in-
volved in the fight against trafficking in persons, ICE is the single 
Federal entity authorized to provide CP for victims of trafficking. 
Within that context, in 2005, ICE agents sponsored 78 percent of 
all initial requests and extensions for CP governmentwide. 
These statistics illustrate the significant contribution by ICE as 
it relates to investigations of individuals and criminal organiza-
tions engaged in the exploitation of men, women and children for 
the purpose of commercial, sex or forced labor. To that end, ICE 
has 305 collateral duty victim witness coordinators who work with 
nongovernment organizations to assist in the provision of victim 
services. 
Finally, in the Global Trafficking in Persons, or G–TIP program, 
the Department of Homeland Security works cooperatively with the 
Department of State and justice. ICE manages some of the G–TIP 
projects with the overall goal of building foreign government capac-
ity to increase the effectiveness of their anti-trafficking law enforce-
ment efforts. 
Additionally, ICE seeks to develop and conduct joint bilateral in-
vestigations to dismantle criminal organizations engaged in the 
trafficking of persons. The ICE Office of Investigations provides 
oversight, guidance and support to ongoing criminal trafficking and 
7child sex tourism investigations, both domestically and internation-
ally. 
ICE coordinates and shares information and intelligence with the 
Center. The Department participates in the Senior Policy and Op-
erating Group, or SPOG, and the Peer Review Panel, both estab-
lished by the President’s G–TIP Initiative. 
The men and women of DHS are grateful for the chance to serve 
the American people on their behalf. I thank you and your col-
leagues for the continued support for the Department and the 
Human Smuggling and Trafficking Center, and I would be pleased 
to answer any of your questions. 
[The statement of Mr. Clark follows:]
PREPARED STTEMENT OF JOHN P. CLARK 
Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Meek and distinguished members of the sub-
committee, it is an honor for me to appear before you today to share the Department 
of Homeland Security’s role in the implementation of the Human Smuggling and 
Trafficking Center (Center) and the Department’s commitment to its critical mis-
sion. 
Criminal travel networks pose a threat to our national security by providing a 
readily available conduit through which persons potentially seeking to harm United 
States interests can enter our country. These networks, primarily engaged in human 
smuggling and trafficking in persons, rely on highly effective transnational alliances 
involving service providers such as recruiters, brokers, document manufacturers, 
transporters and corrupt government officials. To effectively cripple these criminal 
travel networks at source and transit countries, as well as in the United States, 
interagency cooperation and information exchange are of the utmost importance. 
To this end, in July 2004, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Homeland Secu-
rity and the Attorney General created the Human Smuggling and Trafficking Cen-
ter. In December 2004, the Congress formalized the establishment of the Center in 
Section 7202 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. 
Since its inception, the Department of Homeland Security has fully supported this 
very important interagency venture. The Department, through a senior manager 
from U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), served as the first director 
of the Center. In recognition of our continuing commitment to the Center, DHS has 
forwarded the nomination of another ICE executive to the steering group for consid-
eration. In addition, DHS Assistant Secretary Randy Beardsworth has been involved 
in guiding the Center by serving as Co-Chair and as the Senior DHS representative 
to the Center’s Steering Group. 
The Department of Homeland Security has contributed a significant and expand-
ing presence at the Center. In FY 05, DHS had six representatives assigned to the 
Center. ICE had five full-time personnel from the Offices of Investigations and Intel-
ligence and the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) assigned one intelligence analyst. In FY 
06, the ICE personnel assigned to the Center will reach seven representatives: six 
investigators, one of which will be the Center Director, and one intelligence analyst. 
Analysts from DHS’s Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A), and the USCG are 
planning to assign additional personnel to the Center to enhance the Center’s capa-
bilities. 
With respect to budget for the Center, the Department has entered into a cost 
reimbursement agreement with the Departments of State and Justice to address op-
erating expenses for fiscal years 2005 and 2006. The Center and its stakeholders 
continue to work to identify the scope of the Center’s long-term resource needs. 
The Center has made significant achievements, including meeting statutory re-
quirements of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, such 
as the President’s 180-Day Report to Congress relating to the establishment of the 
Human Smuggling and Trafficking Center and the Vulnerabilities Assessment pro-
duced jointly with the National Counter-Terrorism Center. The latter product fo-
cused on vulnerabilities in the U.S. and international travel systems that can be ex-
ploited by terrorists, smugglers and human traffickers. 
In addition to meeting statutory requirements, the Center has produced valuable 
intelligence assessments of countries in Latin America and Asia as well as an as-
sessment of the Document Fraud industry in a specific country. As part of the Secu-
rity and Prosperity Partnership, a trilateral initiative between the governments of 
8Mexico, Canada and the United States, the Center was tasked to conduct a joint 
U.S./Canada assessment on Trafficking in Persons. 
From the perspective of the Department, the Center has been providing strategic, 
operational and tactical information as well as analytical support, which have sup-
ported ICE human smuggling investigations and have resulted in the disruption 
and/or dismantling of criminal travel networks engaged in the movement of foreign 
nationals of special interest to the United States. 
I would like to summarize some of these contributions with the understanding 
that some of the locations have been generalized due to the ongoing nature of the 
investigations and the nature of the Center’s support to us. For example, the Center 
provided valuable support for an ICE investigation conducted by one of our field of-
fices in the northeastern United States that focused on a travel network engaged 
in the smuggling of Indian nationals through the Caribbean and South America. 
The investigation disclosed that these smugglers had engaged in the illegal move-
ment of Special Interest Aliens. Both smugglers were indicted and are in U.S. cus-
tody at this time. 
In a recent event, a flagless fishing vessel transporting over 100 migrants cap-
sized in the Pacific Ocean off the coast of South America while en route to Central 
America. The Center rapidly provided tactical information to ICE investigators that 
had deployed to South America to assist the host government in the criminal inves-
tigation. The collaborative effort of both governments led to the arrest by the foreign 
authorities of the smuggler responsible for the tragedy. 
During an ICE human smuggling investigation, the Center provided intelligence 
information that was shared with a foreign government. The foreign government de-
tained the ICE suspect in accordance with international law. The detention of the 
subject allow both the United States and the foreign government to use the United 
Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime; specifically, the Pro-
tocol Against the Smuggling of Migrants, for the first time for both countries and 
make an extradition to the United States legally possible. The extradition has been 
granted, although it is still pending appeal by the subject in that country. The sub-
ject was identified as a member of a criminal organization engaged in the smuggling 
of Albanian and Macedonian nationals. This criminal organization procured fraudu-
lent travel documents to facilitate the movement of foreign nationals through Eu-
rope and South America, with the United States as the ultimate destination. 
Lastly, in the Global Trafficking in Persons (G–TIP) program, the Department 
works cooperatively with the Departments of State and Justice. ICE manages some 
of the G–TIP projects with the overall goal of building foreign government capacity 
to increase the effectiveness of their anti-trafficking law enforcement efforts. Addi-
tionally, ICE seeks to develop and conduct joint bilateral investigations to dismantle 
criminal organizations engaged in the trafficking in persons. The ICE Office of In-
vestigations provides oversight, guidance and support to ongoing ICE criminal traf-
ficking and child sex tourism investigations, both domestically and internationally. 
ICE coordinates and shares information and intelligence with the Center. The De-
partment participates in the Senior Policy Operating Group (SPOG) and on the Peer 
Review Panel, both established by the President’s TIP Initiative. The ICE TIP ef-
forts are provided to and included in the semiannual Department of State G–TIP 
POTUS Initiative Program Status Report, and to the Attorney General’s Annual Re-
port to Congress on the U.S. Government Efforts to Combat Trafficking in Persons. 
In conclusion, the Center brings together federal agency representatives from the 
policy, law enforcement, intelligence and diplomatic arenas to work together to 
achieve increased progress in addressing the problems of human smuggling, human 
trafficking and clandestine terrorist mobility. The Department is committed to sup-
porting the Center. Its success enhances the Department’s capabilities to address 
these criminal threats and exploitable vulnerabilities. 
The men and women of DHS are grateful for the chance to serve the American 
people and on their behalf, I thank you and your colleagues for your continued sup-
port of the Department and the Human Smuggling and Trafficking Center. 
I would be pleased to answer your questions.
Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Mr. Clark. 
The Chair now recognizes Mr. Chris Swecker, Acting Executive 
Director of Law Enforcement Services at the U.S. Department of 
Justice, for any statement he may have. 
9STATEMENT OF CHRIS SWECKER, ACTING EXECUTIVE 
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR OF LAW ENFORCEMENT SERVICES, 
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 
Mr. SWECKER. Good afternoon, Chairman Rogers, Ranking Mem-
ber Meek, and members of the committee. We appreciate the oppor-
tunity to come here to talk to you today about the Human Smug-
gling and Trafficking Center. This Center now serves as the Fed-
eral Government’s information clearinghouse and intelligence fu-
sion center for all Federal agencies addressing human smuggling, 
human trafficking and potential use of human smuggling routes, 
networks and organizations by known or suspected terrorists. 
The Department of Justice is represented on the Center’s Steer-
ing Committee through the participation of the Assistant Attorney 
Generals of the Civil Rights and Criminal Divisions and the FBI 
Assistant Director of the Criminal Investigative Division. The De-
partment of Homeland Security and the Department of State also 
have representatives on the Steering Committee. 
The Steering Committee meets regularly to help provide the 
growth and direction of the new venture. Each of the AAGs and the 
AD have designated high level staff to work closely with the Center 
Director to provide more day-to-day guidance on the number of 
issues that arise given that the HSTC is still in development. 
The Steering Committee is considering the appropriate staffing 
levels needed in order to carry out the Center’s mission. The Steer-
ing Committee created a working group for that purpose, and that 
working group has been meeting and is expected to make rec-
ommendations to the Steering Committee about staffing issues. 
The HSTC develops intelligence into action by law enforcement 
agencies, serves as the focal point for interagency efforts to address 
clandestine terrorist travel, serves as the clearinghouse for 
deconfliction of member agencies’ efforts regarding human smug-
gling, human trafficking and clandestine terrorist travel, supports 
the efforts of the National Counterterrorism Center, and prepares 
an annual strategic assessment regarding vulnerabilities in the 
United States and international travel systems. 
The HSTC is staffed by administrators, investigators and ana-
lysts from the Departments of State, Homeland Security and Jus-
tice and Intelligence Community representatives. The FBI’s Crimi-
nal Investigative Division has a supervisory special agent and an 
intelligence analyst assigned to the HSTC. Both work closely with 
their counterparts in the FBI’s Counterterrorism Division to ensure 
the free flow of intelligence and investigative information regarding 
any possible connections to terrorism. 
Our analyst at the Center has direct contact with their counter-
part in the Counterterrorism Division. There are analysts in the 
FBI that stand behind the ones detailed tO the Center. Thus, the 
analysts detailed to the Center contribute to the combined product 
of all of the analysts back at headquarters. 
FBI databases are in the Center, and the information in the 
databases is available to other participants through the FBI 
detailees. The FBI and HSTC recently identified a criminal enter-
prise that was smuggling special interest aliens into the United 
States, and the FBI subsequently determined this criminal enter-
prise had a potential nexus to terrorist groups. This intelligence 
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was provided to and is being investigated by the FBI’s 
Counterterrorism Division in conjunction with the appropriate FBI 
Legal Attache Offices. 
FBI personnel at the HSTC also work with and share intel-
ligence with the Mexico City Intelligence Fusion Center, as well as 
the FBI Mexico City Legal Attache Office regarding human smug-
gling and trafficking and any potential connections to terrorist 
travel or terrorist organizations. 
FBI representatives at the HSTC are in the process of estab-
lishing intelligence sharing protocols on human smuggling and 
trafficking matters with all of the Latin American FBI Legal Atta-
che Offices and plan to do the same for the FBI Legats in Africa 
and Asia. 
The HSTC is currently coordinating the pursuit of another 
human smuggling and trafficking matter with the Department of 
State, FBI, ICE and international law enforcement counterparts in 
Asia and Europe regarding smugglers from the United States as 
part of a human trafficking ring operating in Europe. 
The HSTC is coordinating the investigation of this trafficking 
ring with the appropriate FBI Legat office in Europe and Asia, and 
field offices. In addition to its participation in the HSTC, the FBI 
is also using its participation in the Southeastern European Coop-
erative Initiative, SECI, to address its responsibilities for inves-
tigating international criminal enterprises engaged in a variety of 
criminal activity, including human smuggling and trafficking. 
The SECI operates in much the same way as the HSTC does to 
facilitate the exchange of information and coordinate international 
law enforcement efforts among 12 member and 14 observer coun-
tries, primarily focused on transborder crime in the Balkan region. 
The 12 member countries are listed in my statement. I won’t go 
through all of them, but they are all in Eastern Europe and the 
Balkan area. 
SECI also supports the following specialized task forces for coun-
tering transborder crime, including human trafficking and people 
smuggling, drug trafficking, trafficking stolen vehicles, financial 
crimes, smuggling of goods and customs frauds, terrorism and 
other serious transborder crimes. 
Currently we have three agents on assignment in SECI in Bu-
charest, Romania; Sofia, Bulgaria; and Tirana, Albania. 
The FBI uses the Enterprise Theory of Investigation as one of 
our main strategies to investigate criminal enterprises that are in-
volved in human smuggling and human trafficking, as well as 
other organized criminal organizations. 
The Enterprise Theory of Investigation is an intelligence driven 
investigative technique which seeks to identify the full scope of a 
criminal organization. It is a two-step process which involves iden-
tifying the organization and the activities surrounding the organi-
zation while simultaneously identifying the financial assets of the 
criminal investigation for possible forfeiture. Sophisticated tech-
niques are used as well as the RICO statutes and the complex con-
spiracy statutes. 
The FBI has received some intelligence reports from the Center 
that some members of MS–13 have been involved in human smug-
gling by facilitating the transportation of illegal immigrants from 
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Latin American countries through Mexico to the U.S., but not on 
a large scale. Some MS–13 gang members have been smuggled into 
the U.S. utilizing the services of established human trafficking net-
works. This information was derived from interviews of MS–13 
gang members at the time of their arrest in the United States. 
The FBI will continue to support the efforts of the Center and 
its effectiveness in combating human smuggling and human traf-
ficking. I look forward to answering your questions. 
[The statement of Mr. Swecker follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHRIS SWECKER 
Good morning Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Meek, and Members of the 
Committee. I want to thank you for this opportunity to testify before you today 
about the FBI’s role in the Human Smuggling and Trafficking Center. The Acting 
Director of the Center is submitting testimony that outlines in detail the structure, 
staffing and mission of the Center. 
Pursuant to Section 7202 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act 
of 2004 (IRTPA), the Departments of State, Homeland Security, and Justice signed 
a charter in July 2004 to establish the Human Smuggling and Trafficking Center 
(HSTC). This Center now serves as the federal government’s information clearing-
house and intelligence fusion center for all federal agencies addressing human 
smuggling, human trafficking, and the potential use of human smuggling routes, 
networks and organizations by known or suspected terrorists. The Department of 
Justice is represented on the Center’s Steering Committee through the participation 
of the Assistant Attorney Generals of Civil Rights and Criminal Divisions and the 
FBI Assistant Director of the Criminal Investigative Division. The Department of 
Homeland Security and the Department of State also have representatives on the 
Steering Committee. The Steering Committee meets regularly to help guide the 
growth and direction of this new venture. Each of the AAGs and the AD have des-
ignated high-level staff to work closely with the Center Director to provide more 
day-to-day guidance on the number of issues that arise given that the HSTC is still 
in development. The Steering Committee is considering the appropriate staffing lev-
els needed in order to carry out the Center’s mission. The Steering Committee cre-
ated a working group for that purpose. The working group has been meeting and 
is expected to make recommendations to the Steering Committee about staffing 
issues. 
The HSTC develops intelligence into action by law enforcement agencies; serves 
as the focal point for interagency efforts to address clandestine terrorist travel; 
serves as the clearinghouse for deconfliction of member agencies efforts regarding 
human smuggling, human trafficking and clandestine terrorist travel; supports the 
efforts of the National Counterterrorist Center (NCTC), and prepares an annual 
strategic assessment regarding vulnerabilities in the United States and inter-
national travel systems. 
The HSTC is staffed by administrators, investigators, and analysts from the De-
partment of State, the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Jus-
tice, and intelligence community representatives. 
The FBI’s Criminal Investigative Division has a Supervisory Special Agent and 
an Intelligence Analyst assigned to the HSTC. Both work closely with their counter-
parts in the FBI’s Counterterrorism Division to ensure the free flow of intelligence 
and investigative information regarding any possible connections to terrorism. Our 
analyst at the Center has direct contact with their counterpart in the 
Counterterrorism Division. There are analysts in the FBI that ″stand behind″ the 
ones detailed to the Center. Thus, the analysts detailed to the Center contribute the 
combined product of all the analysts back at headquarters. FBI databases are in the 
Center and the information in the databases is available to other participants 
through the FBI detailees. 
The FBI and the HSTC recently identified a criminal enterprise that was smug-
gling Special Interest Aliens (SIAs) into the United States, and the FBI subse-
quently determined this criminal enterprise had a potential nexus to terrorist 
groups. This intelligence was provided to and is being investigated by the FBI’s 
Counterterrorism Division in conjunction with the appropriate FBI Legal Attaches. 
FBI personnel at the HSTC also work with and share intelligence with the Mexico 
City Intelligence Fusion Center (MCIFC), as well as the FBI Mexico City Legal At-
tache office, regarding human smuggling and trafficking, and any potential connec-
tions to terrorist travel or terrorist organizations. FBI representatives at the HSTC 
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are in the process of establishing intelligence sharing protocols on human smuggling 
and trafficking matters with all of the Latin American FBI Legal Attache offices, 
and plan to do the same for the FBI Legal Attaches in Africa and Asia. 
The HSTC is currently coordinating the pursuit of another human smuggling and 
trafficking matter with the Department of State, FBI, Immigration and Custom En-
forcement, and international law enforcement counterparts in Asia and Europe re-
garding smugglers from the United States that are part of a human trafficking ring 
operating in Europe. The HSTC is coordinating the investigation of this trafficking 
ring with the appropriate FBI Legal Attache offices in Europe and Asia. 
In addition to its participation in the HSTC, the FBI is also using its participation 
in the Southeast European Cooperative Initiative (SECI) to address its responsibil-
ities for investigating international criminal enterprises engaged in a variety of 
criminal activity, including human smuggling and trafficking. The SECI operates in 
much the same way as the HSTC does to facilitate the exchange of information and 
to coordinate international law enforcement efforts among 12 member and 14 ob-
server countries, primarily focused on transborder crime in the Balkan Region. The 
12 member countries included in SECI are Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bul-
garia, Croatia, Greece, Hungary, Macedonia, Moldova, Romania, Slovenia, Serbia/
Montenegro, and Turkey. The observer countries are from Austria, Azerbaijan, Bel-
gium, Canada, France, Georgia, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, 
Ukraine, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
The SECI also supports the following specialized task forces for countering trans-
border crime: 
1. Human trafficking and people smuggling 
2. Drug trafficking 
3. Trafficking in stolen vehicles 
4. Financial crimes 
5. Smuggling of goods and customs frauds 
6. Terrorism 
7. Other serious transborder crimes 
The FBI currently has three agents on TDY assignments for SECI in Bucharest, 
Romania; Sofia, Bulgaria; and Tirana, Albania. 
The FBI utilizes the Enterprise Theory of Investigation (ETI) as one of our main 
strategies to investigate criminal enterprises that are involved in human smuggling 
and human trafficking, as well other organized criminal organizations. 
ETI is an intelligence driven investigative technique which seeks to identify the 
full scope of a criminal organization. 
ETI is a two step process, which involves identifying the organization and the 
criminal activities surrounding the organization, while simultaneously identifying 
the financial assets of the criminal organization for possible forfeiture. 
ETI can involve covert techniques, which include informants, physical surveil-
lance, electronic surveillance (wiretaps), undercover operations, and the use of pen 
registers. ETI can also utilize overt techniques, such as Federal Grand Jury sub-
poenas, witness interviews, and the review of media reporting. 
The ETI approach is used with the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza-
tions statute, which is better known as the RICO statute. ETI furthers RICO pros-
ecutions by identifying predicate crimes, identifying the existence of a criminal en-
terprise, and by identifying the individuals in control of the enterprise. 
The FBI has received intelligence reports from the Center that some members of 
MS–13 have been involved in human smuggling by facilitating the transportation 
of illegal migrants from Latin American countries, through Mexico to the United 
States, but not on a large scale. 
Also, some MS–13 gang members have been smuggled into the United States uti-
lizing the services of established human smuggling networks. This information was 
derived from interviews of MS–13 gang members at the time of their arrests in the 
United States. 
The FBI supports the efforts of the Center and its effectiveness in combating 
human smuggling and human trafficking. The FBI’s counterterrorism, international 
organized crime, and domestic trafficking and involuntary servitude/slavery efforts 
have been and will continue to be enhanced by the valuable contributions of the 
Center. Thank you again for the opportunity to appear today. I would be happy to 
answer any of your questions.
Ms. HARRIS. [Presiding.] Thank you, Mr. Swecker, for your testi-
mony. 
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The Chair now recognizes Mr. Marc Gorelick, Acting Director for 
Human Smuggling and Trafficking Center at the United States De-
partment of State, to testify. Welcome. 
STATEMENT OF MARC GORELICK, ACTING DIRECTOR, HUMAN 
SMUGGLING AND TRAFFICKING CENTER, U.S. DEPARTMENT 
OF STATE 
Mr. GORELICK. Thank you. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, and 
distinguished members of the committee. 
Before I begin I would like to extend my sincere gratitude to you 
and the members of your subcommittee for this opportunity to 
share with you the status of the interagency Human Smuggling 
and Trafficking Center, and the strides we have taken to build the 
Center ensure that it plays a significant role in protecting the 
United States. Your interest in our work is greatly appreciated. 
As Acting Director, I wish to make it clear that I am speaking 
on behalf of the Center and not any of the participating agencies. 
Human smuggling and trafficking into the United States con-
stitutes significant risks to national security and public safety. 
Global pipelines present an unacceptable vulnerability to our Na-
tion’s security. These pipelines are used by smuggling and traf-
ficking organizations for moving undocumented aliens and may be 
exploited by terrorists and extremist organizations to gain clandes-
tine entry into the United States. 
The interagency Center is designed to turn all source intelligence 
into law enforcement or other action in three main mission areas: 
Human smuggling, human trafficking—especially the criminal fa-
cilitation and movement of the victims—and the third is the crimi-
nal smuggler and document provider support of clandestine ter-
rorist travel. 
Basically, the HSTC helps fight the global illicit travel industry. 
It is an intelligence fusion center and information clearinghouse 
that was established to break down the information stovepipes to 
ensure that the people and agencies that need intelligence get it on 
a timely basis. It is a valuable new tool that collates, vets and ana-
lyzes information from a range of sources and disseminates action-
able operational leads to Federal law enforcement, foreign policy, 
and intelligence agencies and informs policy makers of threats to 
help them make informed decisions. 
When the HSTC is fully staffed, resourced and supported by par-
ticipating agencies, it will be better able to draw upon and leverage 
their resources, strengths, authorities, and expertise in order to 
achieve greater integration and overall effectiveness in the U.S. 
Government’s enforcement and other response efforts and also to 
work with other governments. 
It is now beginning to fulfill this potential by providing a mecha-
nism to bring together Federal agency representatives from the pol-
icy, law enforcement, intelligence and diplomatic areas to work to-
gether on a full-time basis to achieve increased effectiveness and 
convert intelligence into effective action. We also serve a 
deconfliction role. 
Under the terms of the HSTC charter, the Center is a voluntary 
initiative. Agencies choose to participate because they see the bene-
fits in doing so. These agencies are the Department of State, De-
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partment of Justice, Department of Homeland Security, and mem-
bers of the Intelligence Community. 
The Center’s efforts are fundamentally supportive as it is in-
tended to fuse information obtained from multiple sources and pro-
vide participating agencies with tailored intelligence that can en-
hance law enforcement and other action. It does not direct any ac-
tivities or develop policy. 
While under construction, the Center has become a center of ex-
cellence. U.S. Government agencies are turning to it because of its 
unique expertise and knowledge in the related realms of terrorist 
travel, human smuggling and human trafficking. While we are 
proud of this recognition, we realize that it can be a two-edged 
sword as the Center can become subject to rising expectations be-
yond its capabilities. 
When the charter was negotiated and signed, the Center was 
originally envisioned as a small operation with a limited mission 
and responsibilities. Section 7202 of the Intelligence Reform and 
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 added significant new functions 
and responsibilities to the Center for which the Center was not 
originally created or organized to handle. 
The HSTC is still very much a work in progress and in the short 
time since the charter was signed and the IRTPA established the 
Center in law, the Center staff has made substantial progress in 
building the organization infrastructure and fulfilling its respon-
sibilities. These results were achieved with the minimum of fiscal 
information technology and human resources. However, it still has 
a way to go before it can fulfill all that is required by law or ex-
pected of it by its agencies. 
Currently, the Center staff is made up of only 11 full-time and 
5 part-time people, all of whom are detailed or assigned to the Cen-
ter by their parent agencies. We also have one contract support 
person. 
Mr. Chairman, the Center and the people assigned to it are dedi-
cated to its mission and safeguarding America. We look forward to 
working with the subcommittee in our efforts to secure our na-
tional interests. I also thank you for this opportunity to appear be-
fore the subcommittee, and I will be happy to answer any questions 
you and the other members may have. 
[The statement of Mr. Gorelick follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF MARC GORELICK 
Good afternoon Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the subcommittee. 
Before I begin I would like to extend my sincere gratitude to you and the members 
of your subcommittee for this opportunity to share with you the status of the inter-
agency Human Smuggling and Trafficking Center, and the strides we have taken 
to build the Center and ensure that it plays a significant role in United States ef-
forts against the criminal support of clandestine terrorist travel, alien smuggling 
and trafficking in persons. Your interest in our work is greatly appreciated. As Act-
ing Director I wish to make it clear that I am speaking on behalf of the interagency 
Center and not any of the participating agencies. 
Human smuggling and trafficking into the United States constitute significant 
risks to national security and public safety. Global pipelines present an unaccept-
able vulnerability to our nation’s security. These pipelines can be used by smuggling 
and trafficking organizations for the clandestine entry of undocumented aliens and 
may be exploited by terrorist and extremist organizations to gain entry into the 
United States. 
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The interagency Center is designed to turn all-source intelligence into law en-
forcement or other action in three main mission areas: 
• Human smuggling; 
• Human trafficking (criminal movement aspect); and 
• Criminal smuggler and document provider support of clandestine terrorist 
travel. 
Basically the HSTC helps fight the illicit travel business. 
It is an intelligence fusion center and information clearinghouse that was estab-
lished to break down the information stovepipes to ensure that the people and agen-
cies that need intelligence get it on a timely basis. It is a valuable new tool that 
is designed to collate, vet and analyze intelligence and related information from a 
vast range of sources and disseminate actionable operational leads to federal law 
enforcement, foreign policy and intelligence agencies. It is also designed to inform 
policy makers of threats in order to help them make informed decisions. 
When the HSTC is fully staffed, resourced and supported by participating agen-
cies, it will be better able to draw upon, and leverage their resources, strengths, au-
thorities and expertise in order to achieve greater integration and overall effective-
ness in the U.S. Government’s enforcement and other response efforts, and work 
with other governments. It is now beginning to fulfill this potential by providing a 
mechanism to bring together federal agency representatives from the policy, law en-
forcement, intelligence, and diplomatic areas to work together on a full time basis 
to achieve increased effectiveness, and to convert intelligence into effective law en-
forcement, diplomatic, and other action. 
Under the terms of the HSTC Charter, the Center is a voluntary initiative. Agen-
cies choose to participate because they see benefits. These agencies are: Department 
of State—(International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Consular Affairs, 
Diplomatic Security); Department of Justice—(Criminal Division, Civil Rights Divi-
sion, Federal Bureau of Investigation); Department of Homeland Security—(Immi-
gration and Customs Enforcement, United States Coast Guard, Office of Intelligence 
Analysis) and members of the Intelligence Community. 
The Center’s efforts are fundamentally supportive in nature as the HSTC is in-
tended to fuse information obtained from multiple sources and provide participating 
agencies with tailored intelligence that can enhance law enforcement and other ac-
tion. It does not direct any activities or develop policy. 
Even while under construction, the Center has become a ‘‘center of excellence’’ 
that US government agencies turn to more and more because of its unique expertise 
and knowledge in the realms of smuggler support of terrorist travel, human smug-
gling and human trafficking. While we are proud of this recognition, we realize that 
it can be a two edged sword, as the Center can become subject to rising expectations 
beyond its capabilities. 
The HSTC is still very much a work in progress. In the year and half since the 
Departments of State, Justice and Homeland Security signed the Center Charter, 
and the little over a year since the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention 
Act (IRTPA) established the Center in law, we have made substantial progress in 
building a useful organization and fulfilling its responsibilities. However, it still has 
a way to go before it can fulfill all that is required by the IRTPA or expected of 
it by agencies or other interagency centers such as the National Counterterrorism 
Center, with which the HSTC cooperates. 
Under the Charter, the HSTC was originally envisioned as a small operation with 
a limited mission and responsibilities; with the following functions: 
• Facilitate the broad dissemination of all-source information; 
• Prepare strategic assessments that provide accurate and timely information 
about: organizations’ organization, infrastructure and methods of operation; 
smuggling routes, countries and geographic regions; and criminal methodolo-
gies; 
• Identify issues for interagency attention or coordination; 
• If requested, coordinate select initiatives and provide support; and 
• Serve as a point of contact for cooperation with foreign authorities. 
Section 7202 of the IRTPA of 2004 added significant new functions and respon-
sibilities to the Center, which the Center was not originally created or organized to 
handle: 
• Serve as the focal point for interagency efforts to address terrorist travel; 
• Serve as a clearinghouse with respect to all relevant information from all 
Federal Government agencies in support of the United States strategy to ad-
dress the issues of clandestine terrorist travel, migrant smuggling and traf-
ficking of persons; 
• Ensure cooperation among all relevant policy, law enforcement, diplomatic, 
and intelligence agencies of the Federal Government to improve effectiveness 
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and to convert all information available to the Government relating to the three 
mission areas into tactical, operational, and strategic intelligence that can be 
used to combat such illegal activities; 
• Prepare and submit to Congress, on an annual basis, a strategic assessment 
regarding vulnerabilities in the United States and foreign travel systems that 
may be exploited by international terrorists, human smugglers and traffickers, 
and their facilitators; 
• Support the efforts of the National Counter Terrorism Center. 
The Center staff has labored diligently over the last year. Their efforts have pro-
duced significant results in the areas of building the Center’s infrastructure, ful-
filling some of the requirements assigned to it by the IRTPA, and fostering greater 
U.S. and international cooperation to combat terrorist mobility, human smuggling 
and human trafficking. These results were achieved with a minimum of fiscal, infor-
mation technology (IT), and human resources. Currently the Center staff is made 
up of 11 full-time and five part-time people, all of whom are detailed or assigned 
to the Center by their parent agencies. We also have one contract support person. 
The following outlines some of the accomplishments that have resulted from their 
efforts: 
On June 20, 2005, the HSTC fulfilled IRTPA Section 7202(d), which required the 
President to transmit a report to the Congress outlining progress that has been 
made in standing up the HSTC and to identify its staffing and resource needs. 
The Departments of State, Justice and Homeland Security signed a cost reim-
bursement agreement to cover the HSTC’s non-personnel related operating costs for 
fiscal years 2005 and 2006. This will significantly increase the Center’s ability to 
fulfill its many missions. 
The HSTC is located in a secure location that is supported by the State Depart-
ment. Although it uses a State Department IT backbone, as a fusion center, classi-
fied connectivity and information management are critical. We are establishing IT 
connectivity to many participating agencies, including the Intelligence Community. 
We are also working closely with our partners and have an especially close relation-
ship with the National Counter Terrorism Center. 
The Center has disseminated almost 2000 cables and reports since May 2005. 
Center staff created an Intelligence Dissemination Tracking System and Database 
in December 2005, which also includes any feedback we receive from the recipients. 
The Department of Homeland Security established a searchable HSTC database 
and webpage on the DHS Intelligence Fusion Web-page and uploaded thousands of 
records. The HSTC updates the database daily. 
The Coast Guard established and upgraded a classified website for the Center on 
its SIPRNET Website where the Center’s products are posted. 
The State Department established a public information Internet website to give 
general information about the HSTC (http://www.state.gov/g/inl/c14079.htm) 
All personnel assigned to the Center have available, on their desktops, the State 
Department’s unclassified and classified (up to Secret) systems and the DHS unclas-
sified network, providing the HSTC access to numerous DHS databases. The State 
systems provide access to the State Intranet, e-mail, cable traffic and the Consoli-
dated Consular Database, a powerful tool that contains millions of visa records. 
We have completed installation and activation of DOJnet, which provides more ef-
ficient and secure communications between DOJ personnel assigned to the HSTC, 
and the Justice Data Network. We have also completed installation and activation 
of FBInet terminals, providing the HSTC access to critical FBI data. 
The Center installed secure video conferencing capability for real-time confer-
encing with overseas posts as well as domestic locations. 
The HSTC and the State Department’s Bureau of Consular Affairs are negotiating 
an agreement to give the Center access to the U.S. Passport database. We are also 
negotiating with DHS U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services for appropriate 
HSTC access to USCIS records. 
Secure desktop connectivity with the Intelligence Community has been approved 
by the Director of National Intelligence’s (DNI) Interagency Policy Board (IAPB). We 
hope to have this, and other secure connectivity, installed in the next few months. 
The Center created an electronic and hard copy library of images of genuine and 
fraudulent U.S. and foreign travel documents, and U.S. and foreign fraudulent docu-
ment alerts. This is a limited internal database that is meant to be a research tool 
for analysts in the HSTC. It is not meant to be all inclusive nor is it meant to dupli-
cate the library at the DHS/ICE Forensic Document Laboratory. 
The Center’s staff is also producing a body of useful intelligence assessments and 
reports at the same time they were building its infrastructure and establishing its 
procedures. These products were initiated by statutory requirements, requests from 
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participating agencies, and self generation, where the Center staff saw a vulner-
ability or need to inform. Some of the more notable products include: 
IRTPA § 7202(c)(4) requires the HSTC to prepare and transmit to Congress a stra-
tegic assessment regarding vulnerabilities in the US and international travel sys-
tems that can be exploited by terrorists, smugglers, traffickers and their facilitators. 
The HSTC and the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) jointly drafted a com-
prehensive vulnerabilities assessment and released it as a finished intelligence prod-
uct on September 14, 2005. The report was delivered to Congress on December 16, 
2005. We will be gearing up for the next report. 
The Center is heavily involved in the production of the National Strategy to Com-
bat Terrorist Travel, which the NCTC produced. Most of the Center staff were in-
volved in drafting the strategy and one staff member was a lead drafter of this prod-
uct. 
The Coast Guard and the HSTC jointly issued intelligence products that identified 
certain asylum applicants in the United States, and a foreign national immigrant 
visa applicant with suspected extremist ties. These products resulted in two Joint 
Terrorism Task Force investigations and an individual being excluded from the US 
and having his visa revoked. 
The Center has also produced several joint intelligence assessments with partner 
agencies regarding human smuggling from the East Asia/Pacific region, global 
smuggling routes and trends, human smuggling from China; smuggling and traf-
ficking from the East Asia/Pacific region. The Center published, with the Coast 
Guard, a major threat assessment of smuggling from a South American country. 
The HSTC worked with the FBI to produce joint intelligence products looking at 
human smuggling front companies, human smuggling via Native American reserva-
tions, and human smuggling utilizing public conveyances. And we worked with the 
FBI and DHS Office of Intelligence Analysis to produce an assessment of smugglers 
believed to present special security risks. 
The Center has also produced numerous other products on its own initiative. 
These include a comprehensive intelligence assessment looking at human smuggling 
via a Caribbean country; an intelligence report identifying suspected fraudulent 
shipping companies in India that has proven particularly useful to Consular Affairs; 
an intelligence report on how the high number of lost/stolen US passports in two 
Middle East countries could facilitate illegal travel; and a report about a corrupt for-
eign consul who was selling passports and visas. 
The HSTC is assigned the U.S. lead on a joint U.S./Canada cross-border traf-
ficking in persons threat assessment that is being produced under auspices of the 
US/Canada Cross Border Crime Forum. 
The Center also produced a fact sheet outlining the distinctions between human 
smuggling and human trafficking. This product is being widely used for training 
throughout the U.S. government, and has been used by the Royal Canadian Mount-
ed Police and New York State law enforcement in their training programs. We also 
produced, for the State Department Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in 
Persons, two regional ‘‘snapshots’’ of trafficking inside the United States. The HSTC 
provided analytical support to an Assistant United States Attorney investigating an 
overseas sex tourism case, resulting in a guilty plea by the defendant. 
As part of its foreign affairs function the Center, in coordination with the State 
Department, is cultivating relationships with several foreign immigration services 
and regularly exchanges information with them. This information is being dissemi-
nated to appropriate U.S. agencies. The Center is the U.S. representative to the Pa-
cific Rim Immigration Intelligence Conference. The Center also supports various 
U.S. foreign affairs initiatives, for instance support to the US delegation to the Con-
ference of the Parties to the UN Convention on Transnational Organized Crime and 
its Protocols. We drafted a report on fraudulent document production in Bangkok 
that serves as the basis for the G–8’s action plan to address that issue. 
The HSTC Director sits on the National Security Council Policy Coordination 
Committee on International Organized Crime (PCC). An HSTC staff member draft-
ed a section of the threat assessment that will be used as a basis for updating the 
U.S. Government’s strategy for addressing international organized crime. 
Section 104 of the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2005 re-
quires the Center to submit a report to Congress on links between trafficking in per-
sons and terrorism—specifically links between the profits from trafficking and ter-
rorist financing. 
Mr. Chairman, the Center and the people assigned to it are dedicated to its mis-
sions. We look forward to working with this subcommittee in our efforts to secure 
our national interests. I also thank you for this opportunity to appear before this 
subcommittee and I will be happy to answer any questions you and the other mem-
bers may have.
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Ms. HARRIS. Thank you, Mr. Gorelick, for your testimony. At this 
time I have several questions I would like to ask. As noted in my 
opening statement, I requested Chairman Rogers to convene this 
hearing to address my concerns about national security threats 
posed by terrorist travel, human smuggling and sex trafficking and 
whether the Federal Government is effectively tackling this growth 
problem. 
Today I have even more concerns because of the numerous obsta-
cles we received in trying to arrange this hearing in the first place, 
and I am frustrated as well as disappointed that several witnesses 
to whom we repeatedly extended invitations have failed to avail 
themselves to this committee. Principally Randy Beerswith, the As-
sistant Secretary for Strategic Planning for DHS, and chairs DHS 
D.C. Steering Committee, which of course is responsible for pro-
viding policy guidance and oversight of the Center, was not avail-
able. State was not available nor sent anyone, and so I want to 
once again thank the witnesses who have chosen to be here today. 
And I would appreciate if you could keep your answers to these 
initial questions, just a yes or no, just kind of just to get an over-
view. 
The first question is do you believe that there are adequate staff-
ing levels at the HSTC? Mr. Clark, Mr. Swecker and Mr. Gorelick. 
Mr. CLARK. This is a yes or no? 
Ms. HARRIS. We will start out. I will come back to you to give 
you a little more information. 
Mr. CLARK. Then no. 
Ms. HARRIS. Mr. Swecker. 
Mr. SWECKER. At this point in time, yes. 
Mr. GORELICK. No. 
Ms. HARRIS. With regard to funding, do you think there is ade-
quate funding and would a dedicated item, line item of funding, 
from the Federal Government help the Center? Mr. Gorelick? 
Mr. GORELICK. If I could, the Steering Group established the 
Working Group to look into that and make recommendations to the 
Steering Group, which the Steering Group will follow up on. 
Ms. HARRIS. Presently, do you think the funding levels are ade-
quate? 
Mr. GORELICK. No. 
Ms. HARRIS. Mr. Swecker. 
Mr. SWECKER. They always tell us to stay away from budget 
questions, but the funding comes from each individual agency. So 
I would say no. It needs to be funded separately. 
Ms. HARRIS. Mr. Clark. 
Mr. CLARK. I would second what Mr. SWecker said. 
Ms. HARRIS. Do you think that the Center should have an oper-
ational capability? I mean you have all of these organizational 
issues but then how—and they are not always implemented. Is 
there a problem in the operations? 
While I understand this is an interagency fusion center of infor-
mation, do you feel that there should be an operational capability 
to follow up on the leads in intelligence that are developed by the 
Center? Mr.Swecker? 
Mr. SWECKER. No. 
Ms. HARRIS. Mr. Clark? 
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Mr. CLARK. No. 
Ms. HARRIS. Mr. Gorelick? 
Mr. GORELICK. No. 
Ms. HARRIS. And finally on these yes or no questions, in your re-
view is the mission of the Center clearly defined? Mr. Clark? 
Mr. CLARK. Yes. 
Mr. SWECKER. Yes. 
Mr. GORELICK. Yes. 
Ms. HARRIS. I have a couple more minutes. 
Mr. Swecker, I know that there are 650 intelligence analysts that 
were hired in 2004. There is supposed to be up to over a thousand 
by the end of 2005. Would any of those analysts be assigned to the 
Center to your knowledge? 
Mr. SWECKER. One is assigned out there full time right now 
along with an agent. There is a counterterrorism analyst that sup-
ports the Center but sits out at NCTC. 
Ms. HARRIS. Do you anticipate any more of those additional 400 
analysts, will any more be assigned to the Center? 
Mr. SWECKER. It is possible. We are trying to get a 
counterterrorism analyst out there full time. 
Ms. HARRIS. Do you think it requires more? 
Mr. SWECKER. A counterterrorism analyst should be out there 
full time, yes. 
Ms. HARRIS. Thank you. And Mr. Clark, there was a joint vision 
between Secretary Rice and Secretary of Homeland Security 
Chertoff that said that the Human Smuggling and Trafficking Cen-
ter as part of their smarter screening goal would be to develop and 
use travel intelligence before travelers arrive. What is your time 
frame in accomplishing this, and what steps are you taking and 
what will you do to achieve this goal? 
Mr. CLARK. I am not familiar with the particulars. I know the 
Customs and Border Protection is working especially with foreign 
governments to work on that screening process and part of their 
moving the borders out. Unfortunately, I don’t have a timetable for 
when they feel that would be most effectively implemented. 
Ms. HARRIS. Okay, and finally, Mr. Gorelick, thank you for your 
service as Acting Director of this very important center. I would 
ask you, what changes would you recommend in how the three 
Cabinet departments support the Center? 
Mr. GORELICK. As I stated before, the Working Group that the 
Steering Group formed is going to be making recommendations to 
the Steering Group. 
Ms. HARRIS. Thank you. My time is completed. 
Thank you for your answers. I am going to call on the members 
as they have arrived accordingly, and the order of questions that 
will be, Congressman Meek, Pascrell—Reichert and Pascrell and, 
sorry, and Ms. Jackson-Lee. 
Mr. MEEK. Thank you, Ms. Harris. I would like, this question is 
to either one of you on the panel. 
How does HSTC plan to produce any reports examining oper-
ational challenges at the Center? How do you produce your plans? 
Because I hear your response to Ms. Harris, but also I had an op-
portunity to see your statement today. And none of you really put 
forth any real statement to we can do more if we had this level of 
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cooperation, or we could do more if we had a line item budget, be-
cause from what I understand now you all kind of come together 
and share budgets. 
How do you measure your success versus what you can do if 
there was more organization and structure in an operation that, 
number one, the watchword should be organization? 
Mr. GORELICK. The Center—management at the Center has cre-
ated a work plan, a multi-year work plan in which we have taken 
requests from various agencies for joint projects as well as requests 
for projects that the Center should do, self-generated projects and 
of course statutory required reports. We have laid those out and 
looked at our resources, we have drawn a line on what we can do 
and prioritized those projects. The priorities first are based on 
threats to national security, and second based on threats to public 
safety. 
National security threats of course are the terrorist travel 
threats, and public safety are human smuggling and human traf-
ficking. That is how we basically prioritize our work and develop 
our work plan. 
Mr. MEEK. Thank you very much. I am going to limit my ques-
tions because we are about—they just called a vote so, Madam 
Chair, I am going to relinquish the rest of my time so hopefully 
other members will be able to ask questions. 
Ms. HARRIS. Mr. Reichert. 
Mr. REICHERT. Thank you, Madam Chair. 
In March of this year, an article appeared in the Seattle Times. 
It was reported that the UAE has had some involvement in traf-
ficking young boys for camel races. 
Have you been involved in that investigation? What is your re-
sponsibility and role? Do you know anything about that? 
Mr Clark. I am not familiar. I have read the story. I don’t know 
that there was an ICE investigation per se over there in any capac-
ity on that. 
Mr. SWECKER. No FBI investigation I am aware of. 
Mr. GORELICK. I believe that that was also mentioned in previous 
TIP reports, annual TIP reports. But I also believe that the UAE 
has curtailed that practice or tried. I would have to defer to G–TIP 
to answer more fully. 
Mr. REICHERT. This is not a new issue that has come up. It has 
been an issue that they have been dealing with for a while. But 
no one here at the table has been involved in that investigation, 
knows anything about it? 
Mr. GORELICK. No. 
Mr. REICHERT. Can you explain your program called Lost Inno-
cence? 
Mr. SWECKER. That is an FBI initiative that was designed to con-
solidate task forces around the country or establish task forces 
around the country to address underage female forced prostitution. 
I think it exists in over, almost two dozen offices around the coun-
try. It consists of sort of a multi-disciplinary team of State and 
local law enforcement officers, FBI agents and components from 
the social services, various social service agencies in the country 
designed to get at sex prostitution rings, especially, or targeting 
specifically underage girls. It has been a—we did a takedown about 
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2 or 3 months ago, national takedown, and I think there were over 
100 arrests. It has been a very successful initiative which we hope 
to enhance and build on. 
Mr. REICHERT. It is an initiative that works with local law en-
forcement then? 
Mr. SWECKER. Yes, sir. State and local law enforcement generally 
come across this type of crime first through their vice squads and 
through their street operations, and part of the issue is to educate 
the officers that these girls are victims, not necessarily criminals. 
Mr. REICHERT. Thank you. I will yield the balance of my time. 
Ms. HARRIS. Thank you. Mr. Pascrell. 
Mr. PASCRELL. One question I have, and anybody can respond to 
it, is how many—not how many. We know how many folks have 
been intercepted that were smuggled into this country. I would like 
to know for the majority, where are the majority coming from? 
Mr. CLARK. The vast majority are coming from Mexico just be-
cause of the contiguous border. I think we probably have the larger 
numbers as geographically we move south through Central and 
South America, just because of the difficulty of maritime smuggling 
in terms of getting here to the United States. 
Mr. PASCRELL. And that is where most of the networking is being 
done through the Mexican-American borders? 
Mr. CLARK. We find that most of the routes are coming probably 
up through Central America, then land routes up in terms of the 
larger networks in the global smuggling mapping, heading toward 
South America, up through Central America or some of it going 
through the Caribbean then by maritime. 
Mr. PASCRELL. And that is more of a problem than those that are 
being smuggled in from the Balkans and Russia? 
Mr. CLARK. Less so coming to the United States, although we do 
see it on the East Coast. And a lot of that can even be through 
commercial airlines with phony documents and things of that na-
ture, not usually in terms of mass numbers. 
Mr. PASCRELL. And finally, are you getting cooperation from the 
Mexican government because of the preponderance of this net-
working? 
Mr. CLARK. We are. We are getting increased cooperation. In 
fact, the government of Mexico through the TIP program is setting 
up various task forces. We have assigned various ICE assets down 
to Mexico to work with them collaboratively on smuggling and traf-
ficking as well. 
Mr. PASCRELL. What is the major reason for the smuggling? 
What is the purpose coming from Central America in your eyes? 
Mr. CLARK. The organizations, it is always just profit. The smug-
gling organizations, it is pure profit. 
Mr. PASCRELL. Are there members, are there citizens involved in 
this, United States citizens? 
Mr. CLARK. Not usually as much. It is usually foreign nationals. 
Mr. PASCRELL. So foreign nationals are setting up this whole net-
work on their own without the help of any citizens in the United 
States? Do you believe that? 
Mr. CLARK. I am not saying they don’t help them. I am saying 
generally it is more foreign nationals involved with it. 
Mr. PASCRELL. Thank you. 
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Ms. HARRIS. Thank you. Representative Jackson-Lee. 
Ms. JACKSON-LEE. Thank you very much. This is obviously an 
enormously important issue and I am going to have a short period 
of time, and if I can yield to you gentlemen for a succinct answer 
to a question of range. 
Are we at a crisis and to what extent does the crisis exist, mean-
ing the porousness of our border and the utilization of human 
smuggling for terrorists activities? I want the highest range of cri-
sis. I want to know what problem we are dealing with. 
And then secondarily it befuddles me about the ability of intel-
ligence sharing with the HSTC. I understand that the ICE data-
base may be different from the FBI, and there may not be a sin-
gular stream of intelligence that is shared so that these particular 
infractions, intrusions into our security system can be corrected. 
Would you answer, each of you, the crisis question and second-
arily the question of the stream of intelligence and databases that 
connect to each other, or are you able to be shared? Starting with 
Mr. Clark. 
Mr. CLARK. I would say that the pressure on the border in terms 
of smuggling has increased recently. I think we are doing a better 
job in terms of enhancing the Border Patrol’s capabilities between 
the ports, educating and training the inspectors at the ports rel-
ative to phony documents, on enhancing ICE to investigate some 
of the smuggling organizations. But I still think it has been an in-
creasing problem. 
Ms. JACKSON-LEE. One to 10? 
Mr. CLARK. It is hard to say. In terms of comparisons I grade it 
as a 7. 
Mr. SWECKER. You know, I hesitate to use the word ‘‘crisis’’ be-
cause I think I have a different definition of that word. That 
means, you know, clear present imminent danger. I would say 
there is a serious problem because there is the potential for a ter-
rorist cell to come in through an alien smuggling organization, 
come in through that means. 
I will say, however, we haven’t found—we have found very few 
instances where that has happened. Most of these, the 19 hijackers 
came in legally for the most part. But I would look at it as a very 
gray—
Ms. JACKSON-LEE. Is it an increasing problem from 2001? 
Mr. SWECKER. Yes. 
Ms. JACKSON-LEE. Okay, thank you. Mr. Gorelick. 
Mr. GORELICK. I would say it is a large problem. And as a prob-
lem, it is not just dealing with the movement of people. If you look 
at alien smuggling or the illicit movement of people, it is also con-
nected to terrorism, movement of terrorists, possible movement of 
terrorists. 
It is connected to corruption of public officials, both in the United 
States and overseas. Alien smugglers can’t move people across bor-
ders unless they corrupt immigration and border authorities. 
Ms. JACKSON-LEE. One to ten? 
Mr. GORELICK. It is a 7. 
Ms. JACKSON-LEE. I didn’t get your number. 
Mr. SWECKER. I will go with the 7 also. It is an important prob-
lem that needs to be addressed. 
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Ms. JACKSON-LEE. Does anyone want to talk about—in con-
cluding because of the bells—the whole idea of intelligence sharing, 
the lack of a singular database between ICE, FBI to even share 
this information. 
Mr. CLARK. It is difficult relative to what the database has cap-
tured to say there should be one database to serve all agencies es-
pecially when you consider what the FBI does in terms of 
counterterrorism is of a much more classified nature than what 
ICE does generally in a criminal capacity. 
I would say something like the Center, where all the intelligence 
is there and available to the agencies, gets us over some of the 
problems relative to the databases or data banks not actually com-
porting to fuse everything into one. 
Mr. SWECKER. It is systemic throughout government that all of 
the agencies have their own databases. But I will say there is an 
intelligence sharing method or network. It is a classified system 
that all intelligence analysts tap into and pull information from. So 
we all post our information on this network and any analyst that 
participates in this network can pull the information out. 
Mr. GORELICK. As a fusion center we have looked at this prob-
lem, and particularly the fact that various agencies have their var-
ious databases and even different communication systems. It is not 
just broken up between the agencies but also broken up between 
classifications, whether it is unclassified or classified information 
you are dealing with, you have two separate systems. 
We have also discussed taking all the information and trying to 
put it into one system in the Center, but that would take a lot of 
money and effort. 
Ms. JACKSON-LEE. Let me thank you, let me ask unanimous con-
sent to ask to have a statement by Susan Ginsberg, nonresident 
Fellow, Migration Policy Institute, put into the record. 
Ms. HARRIS. Absolutely. I was going to do that, yes. Thank you, 
Ms. Jackson-Lee. Your time has expired. I, too, concur with the 
Ginsberg insertion into the record. She has a number of issues and 
concerns that she has addressed as well as solutions. 
[The statement of Ms. Ginsburg follows:]
FOR THE RECORD 
SUBMITTED TO THE COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 
SUBCOMMITTEE ON MANAGEMENT, INTEGRATION AND OVERSIGHT 
The 9/11 Reform Act: Examining the Implementation of 
the Human Smuggling and Trafficking Center 
MARCH 8, 2006
BY 
SUSAN GINSBURG 
NONRESIDENT FELLOW 
MIGRATION POLICY INSTITUTE 
Mr. Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Meek, and Members of the Sub-
committee, it is a privilege to provide testimony for your consideration about the 
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vital homeland security mission of the Human Smuggling and Trafficking Center 
(HSTC). My testimony discusses terrorist travel facilitation as a core aspect of 
homeland security that must be addressed together with human trafficking and 
human smuggling. 
Congress’ statutory establishment of the HSTC in the Intelligence Reform and 
Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) provides the foundation for critical US action 
against the global illicit travel market. The illicit travel market is fueled by three 
diverse and devastatingly harmful groups: terrorists, who in order to function must 
travel to gain access to countries but also remain clandestine; human traffickers; 
and human smugglers. 
The mission of the HSTC reflects the fact that the triple threat of terrorist access, 
human degradation and rights violations, and the violence of transnational orga-
nized smuggling crimes, derives in part from a single set of overlapping and inter-
woven illicit travel practices. The HSTC’s commitment to three purposes simulta-
neously may be unusual (typically, government entities focus on one type of security 
issue at a time, for example, narcotics traffickers, illegal dealers in arms, and ter-
rorist groups), but focusing on only one of the three paramount threats associated 
with travel would curtail the full flow of information necessary to effectively defend 
against and attack any one of these three threats. 
The HSTC has already demonstrated that it can contribute significantly to the 
protection of homeland security and the rule of law, but much can be done to 
strengthen this vital organization. 
As a team leader and senior counsel on the staff of the 9/11 Commission, I had 
overall responsibility for the investigation of and recommendations concerning the 
entry of the September 11th terrorists into the United States. During the 1990s, I 
developed national crime control policy as an advisor to the Under Secretary for En-
forcement in the Department of the Treasury, which oversaw US Customs, ATF, 
and FinCEN among other agencies. In that capacity I worked closely with the De-
partment of Justice on crime control policy issues and programs. In the late 1970s 
I served in the Department of States? Bureau of International Narcotics Matters, 
now the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL). Thus, I 
have experience with the challenge of establishing innovative and joint efforts 
among several of the agencies and departments whose contributions are essential 
for the success of the HSTC in its vital homeland security mission. Recently, I have 
written a report, Countering Terrorist Mobility: Shaping an Operational Strategy, 
published by the Migration Policy Institute. This report places the role of the HSTC 
in the context of the larger operational strategy to counter terrorist travel. I am pro-
viding the Subcommittee with copies of this report for your consideration. 
The HSTC exemplifies the promise and problems of the new post-9/11 security in-
formation organizations that are based on a concept of jointness—or fusion, or inte-
gration—and which are vital to the homeland security of the United States. Joint 
centers are needed to connect the dots at the tactical and investigative level and 
to provide a comprehensive view of the big picture to support clear strategic anal-
ysis. Joint centers combine classic national security and crime control concerns, 
bridge the classified and unclassified environments, and confront organizations that 
cross foreign and domestic borders. 
But organizations that depend on collaboration are challenged in today’s govern-
ment environment because the individual agencies that are essential to joint efforts 
are pitted against each other in the competition for resources and historically have 
derived a sense of identity and accomplishment from winning contests of institu-
tional culture. Thus, it all too often goes against the incentive structure now in 
place, and against the grain, to contribute resources to and share authority for ac-
tivities through joint efforts. 
Because of the essential role of the HSTC in attacking the global illicit travel 
market to protect homeland security, and the challenges the HSTC faces, Congress? 
thoughtful oversight and decisive legislation are important and timely.
THE ILLICIT TRAVEL MARKET 
Terrorists’ need to move around globally—to go to and from meetings, recruit, 
train, purchase and transport material, reconnoiter and strike—exposes them to po-
tential detection. Terrorist operations therefore dedicate specific resources and at-
tention to travel, or mobility, or movement—three words for the same functional 
element, the need to gain access to countries and facilities, which must be done 
without being detected. For the United States and its security partners, terrorist 
mobility represents an aspect of the terrorist threat to be defended against by im-
proving security processes, but it is also simultaneously a vulnerability of terrorists 
that must be exploited. 
25
Terrorist travel facilitators, human traffickers, and human smugglers all system-
atically exploit legitimate international travel channels and national entry and resi-
dence channels. All these different types of groups are engaged in interwoven travel 
schemes and criminal enterprises. Human smuggling and trafficking organizations 
can be detected and intercepted, and aspects of the system they rely on subjected 
to greater regulation and penalties. Terrorist travel facilitators, their terrorist cli-
ents, and partner criminal enterprises can also be targeted and interdicted through 
law enforcement, regulatory processes, intelligence operations, and diplomacy that 
advance security standards, the rule of law, and enforcement and intelligence co-
operation in travel channels. 
The world of illicit travel and terrorist travel tactics is as intricate, specialized, 
interwoven, and evolving as the world of money laundering and terrorist finance. 
The need to travel creates an illicit world market fueled and exploited by the range 
of terrorists and transnational criminal groups that organize travel on a large or 
small scale. 
Although the activities of drug traffickers, arms traffickers, money launderers, 
and terrorist financiers are familiar in public policy circles and in the media, the 
idea of an illicit travel market and the image of a terrorist travel facilitator as the 
foundation of terrorists? ability to travel, cross borders, and enter the United States 
and other countries are not as widely recognized. 
The 9/11 Commission came to focus on terrorist travel because it undertook a de-
tailed examination of the visa and port of entry processes as they functioned to pro-
tect the homeland leading up to 9/11. Osama bin Ladin’s senior leadership and in-
ternal terrorist travel facilitators largely planned al-Qa’ida travel tactics, managed 
al-Qa’ida travel, and controlled the travel of the 9/11 conspirators. Through the re-
search process the Commission learned, however, that the travel, entry, and resi-
dence tactics of the conspirators involved in the 9/11 plot and of the 19 hijackers 
themselves, were part of a much bigger picture of global illicit travel. Al Qaeda trav-
el tactics were similar to and to some degree overlapped with the larger illicit travel 
market. 
Some of these terrorist mobility tactics and illicit travel market services are de-
scribed in some detail in a 9/11 Commission Staff Report entitled 9/11 and Terrorist 
Travel, authored by Thomas R. Eldridge, Walter T. Hempel II, Janice L. Kephart, 
Kelly Moore, and myself, with the assistance of Joanne M. Accolla. This report iden-
tified up to 21 different entry and embedding tactics used by terrorists during the 
1990s and in support of the 9/11 plot, from the use of multiple fake passports to 
facilitation by corrupt border officials and the use of multiple types of immigration 
fraud. 
Travel facilitator networks that support terrorist travel rely on a continuum of 
participants that overlap with human smuggling and human trafficking networks. 
Among many other illicit travel channels, travel facilitator networks include: 
• Actual terrorists who are travel facilitators and their couriers, such as those 
individuals the 9/11 Commission documented were running the al-Qa’ida pass-
port office in Kandahar; 
• Cells that are trafficking in documents as a source of funds for operations; 
• Corrupt passport and border officials who are either subject to bribery or are 
sympathetic; 
• Organized criminal organizations, involved in human smuggling and traf-
ficking or transporting narcotics or weapons material who might provide serv-
ices to terrorists for payment or exchange; and 
• Travel agencies and employer organizations that may wittingly or unwittingly 
assist terrorists. 
The illicit travel market is above all characterized by its global nature and by the 
fact that countering terrorist mobility requires an understanding of global patterns 
and actions, and a coordinated response to them. For example, an Algerian is ar-
rested in France for supplying forged documents to Iraqi-bound volunteers. Jamaah 
Islamiyah leader Hambali is arrested in Thailand carrying two Spanish passports. 
Belgian, French, and Portuguese passports are also available in Bangkok. Couriers 
who supply them may be Greek or Dutch. 
Understanding and interdicting these patterns of activity is at the core of US 
counterterrorism, crime control, and immigration management. Are terrorists favor-
ing passage by land, sea or air routes, licit or illicit channels? What smuggling orga-
nizations are exploited by terrorists? What illicit travel businesses are terrorist-op-
erated? How can we penetrate the aliases, documents and legends that cloak ter-
rorist identities? Which embarkation points—Canada or Europe, Mexico or Paki-
stan—are used for what purposes?
26
ILLICIT TRAVEL INFORMATION AND INTERDICTION: CONGRESSIONAL 
ACTION 
The US government can only obtain a comprehensive and accurate picture of il-
licit travel networks and tactics by simultaneously collecting and analyzing informa-
tion from the various elements of the illicit travel market. Given the interwoven 
schemes and routes that terrorists, human traffickers, and smugglers use, it is not 
possible to separate counterterrorism from crime control or vice versa due to the fact 
that the investigative and intelligence leads from one group?s exploiting of travel 
channels to that of another group are too useful. 
The combined intelligence, information, and investigative approach will enable 
policymakers and operational managers to decide what diplomatic, legal, enforce-
ment, and special operations should be taken to interdict and dismantle terrorist or-
ganizations, human trafficking organizations, human smuggling organizations, and 
illicit travel service providers which are part of or selling services to terrorist and 
other criminal organizations. 
To build this comprehensive picture using an all-source approach, the government 
must draw on the resources and skills of the legacy intelligence community; crime 
control organizations at the federal, state, and local levels; the border and immigra-
tion agencies; and the counterparts of our intelligence, crime control, and border 
agencies in foreign countries. 
The Human Smuggling and Trafficking Center was first conceived of in the 
late 1990s in response to a new awareness of the violence associated with large-
scale human smuggling and the horrors of human trafficking. It was established in 
early 2001. As its name reflects, the HSTC’s initial purpose was to provide inte-
grated intelligence on human smuggling and trafficking organizations to support ac-
tions against them by the US government, foreign governments, and international 
organizations. The 9/11 attacks demonstrated the catastrophic consequences of ter-
rorist exploitation of global travel pathways and US border systems. Recognizing 
that terrorists use criminal travel networks to support their activities, the Depart-
ment of State, the Department of Justice, and the Department of Homeland Secu-
rity signed a charter for the HSTC that added efforts against terrorist travel facili-
tation to its mission. 
The HSTC thus incrementally and logically has become a major resource for at-
tacking the illicit travel sphere as a means of finding terrorists and constraining ter-
rorist mobility; deterring and controlling the crimes of human trafficking and smug-
gling; and through those functions supporting immigration management and mi-
grant safety. 
The 9/11 Commission recognized that terrorist travel and crime control are in-
separable because terrorist travel tactics intersect the illicit travel market that also 
services human smugglers and traffickers and other criminals. The Commission 
therefore recommended that: ‘‘The United States should combine terrorist travel in-
telligence, operations, and law enforcement in a strategy to intercept terrorists, find 
terrorist travel facilitators, and constrain terrorist mobility.’’ It stated specifically 
that the small terrorist travel intelligence program was producing disproportion-
ately useful results and should be expanded. 
Continuing this bi-partisan concern about terrorist travel and the illicit market 
in travel services, Congress in Sections 7201–2 of the Intelligence Reform and Ter-
rorism Prevention Act: 
• mandated a new terrorist travel strategy; 
• required an assessment by the Human Smuggling and Trafficking Center of 
US vulnerability to travel and immigration system exploitation; 
• established the Human Smuggling and Trafficking Center as a statutory enti-
ty; and 
• directed that federal agencies report back to Congress on how to make the 
Human Smuggling and Trafficking Center more effective in countering terrorist 
travel. 
Congress enacted that legislation in December 2004. Over a year later, it is now 
an appropriate time to assess what has been and still must be done to make the 
HSTC an effective fusion center that provides a platform for a strong and coordi-
nated US government attack on illicit travel by terrorists, human traffickers, and 
human smugglers.
HSTC: MISSION AND REQUIREMENTS 
The vital homeland security mission of the Human Smuggling and Trafficking 
Center is to counter these tactics, broadly speaking, in three fundamental ways in-
cluding: 
• Facilitating broad dissemination of all-source information about the illicit 
travel market and its terrorist, human trafficker, and smuggler elements; 
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• Preparing operational, tactical, and strategic assessments, with the emphasis 
on ongoing field support and an annual risk (threat and vulnerability) assess-
ment for participating agencies and for Congress; and 
• Identifying issues for further joint attention. 
To grow into its full potential as a center for the development of information, as-
sessments, issue identification, and initiative support relating to terrorist travel, 
human trafficking, and human smuggling, several aspects of the HSTC need 
strengthening. These relate to its: (1) mission; (2) senior management; (3) govern-
ance; and, (4) resources. 
The suggestions below for strengthening the HSTC in these four areas are offered 
with two caveats. 
First, the ideas offered are not intended to supplant the ongoing discussion among 
HSTC officials and their Steering Group supervisors and with Congress, but to con-
tribute some ideas to the mix. Second, the goal of these suggestions is to make some 
immediate improvements based on currently recognized issues, rather than to solve 
all problems for all time. This is especially so in that Congress’ own committee 
structure makes it challenging to take into account all the critical interests at stake 
by various congressional committees in one piece of legislation. 
With these caveats, some possible approaches to strengthening the HSTC are dis-
cussed below.
Mission 
The HSTC’s mission should be clarified. The original Charter for the HSTC cre-
ated one set of mandates, and then the Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention 
Act (IRTPA) created a second set. These mandates define purposes and they define 
functions or tasks. All the desired purposes and functions should be placed on the 
same legislative footing. 
The three current purposes are to counter terrorist travel, human trafficking, and 
human smuggling. It is important to have all three purposes considered together as 
one entity that can integrate information and identify opportunities for action in the 
multiple spheres of law enforcement, intelligence, policy, diplomacy, and even mili-
tary affairs, and ensure that attention to the various issues is balanced among the 
interwoven concerns of national security, human rights, and crime control. 
Congress should consider including one additional purpose to this list: countering 
the illicit travel market and illicit travel facilitators. This purpose is the common 
denominator that relates to and supports the missions of countering terrorist travel, 
human trafficking and human smuggling, and would support US action against 
these and other transnational criminal activity, such as smuggling of all kinds. 
Countering the illicit travel market is therefore a homeland security mission that 
is consistent with and supports the existing national security, human rights, and 
crime control purposes of the HSTC. 
The functions of the HSTC listed in the Charter and/or IRTPA include: 
• serving as a clearinghouse and disseminating all-source information; 
• supporting select initiatives, including of the National Counterterrorism Cen-
ter; 
• preparing strategic assessments; 
• identifying issues for possible enhanced interagency attention; and 
• coordinating and ensuring coordination among all relevant agencies. 
As with the HSTC’s purposes, the functions currently established only by Charter 
should be embodied in legislation. These five purposes—informational, tactical, stra-
tegic, issue identification for joint operations and policymaking, and coordination—
all make sense. 
The role of the HSTC in strategic assessment requires clarification. The annual 
strategic assessment that Congress required in the IRTPA is described as a vulner-
ability assessment, to identify vulnerabilities that may be exploited by international 
terrorists, human smugglers and traffickers, and travel facilitators. It would be 
helpful if in conjunction with this vulnerability assessment by the HSTC there was 
a threat assessment that focused on the actual threats posed by terrorist group mo-
bility capability and intent, human smugglers, human traffickers, and other travel 
facilitators. (With respect to terrorism, such an assessment requires the strategic 
operational direction of, and likely most or all of the actual preparation by, per-
sonnel of the National Counterterrorism Center, pursuant to the IRTPA.) A threat 
assessment will support government leadership in setting priorities as to which 
vulnerabilities should be addressed to reduce actual threats, a process commonly re-
ferred to as risk assessment.
Senior management 
Directing the HSTC is a major responsibility. Congress should ensure it is exer-
cised by a senior manager with relevant operational, policy, and managerial experi-
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ence. The key requirements of the Director and Deputy Director, apart from such 
management capability, are a commitment to collaboration or joint functioning, and 
strategic vision for the organization.
Governance 
The governance and organizational structure of the HSTC are unique and still 
provide a ‘‘demonstration project’’ for a successful joint center. An interagency Steer-
ing Group provides guidance and the Director and Deputy Director who manage 
HSTC’s operations are accountable through the Steering Group to the Secretary of 
State, Attorney General, and Secretary for Homeland Security. 
This tripartite management structure has been critical to maintaining appro-
priately balanced focus on the two original operational arenas for the HSTC: human 
trafficking, an issue principally associated with the Department of State, and 
human smuggling, an issue principally associated with legacy INS and the Depart-
ment of Homeland Security. The Attorney General—as the executive of the Depart-
ment of Justice, the supervisor of US attorneys and the FBI, a partner with the Sec-
retary of State in US participation in international legal matters, and the executive 
in charge of the immigration appeals process—has institutional interests in enforce-
ment and regulation relating to both human smuggling and trafficking that will 
tend to lead to a balanced commitment to both sets of goals. 
This governance structure has two weaknesses that merit correction by Congress. 
First, in a structure where the two pre-9/11 policy arenas are linked to operational 
authorities of supervisory departments, the HSTC legislation does not provide for 
a Steering Committee member and Cabinet-level authority with comparable oper-
ational authority in the arena of global terrorist travel facilitation. This omission un-
dermines the terrorist travel facilitation mission of the HSTC. To correct this prob-
lem legislatively, a designee of the Director of National Intelligence, likely from the 
National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), should be added to the Steering Com-
mittee, and the Director of National Intelligence should be added as the Cabinet-
level equivalent. The formal presence of the NCTC will not only benefit the terrorist 
travel mission but also the two other missions, because information that supports 
the interdiction of terrorists overseas and the constraining of terrorist travel may 
also assist in the dismantling and deterring of human trafficking and smuggling or-
ganizations. For example, the core intelligence community may learn of a corrupt 
passport official who is facilitating terrorist travel, human smuggling, and human 
trafficking. 
Second, the governance structure of the HSTC appears to place its Director in an 
untenable management structure. He or she is accountable through a committee to 
three Cabinet heads, and as a practical matter already to four, since the NCTC re-
porting to the DNI is responsible for strategic operational planning relating to ter-
rorism. When the three or four Cabinet level executives are multiplied by the nu-
merous responsible Congressional committees, the Director’s ability to make man-
agement decisions is rendered even more unworkable on a day-to-day basis and it 
becomes unstable over time. 
Although the Steering Group could be comprised of a group of results-oriented in-
dividuals who might be personally committed to collaboration, the formal reporting 
structure is likely to undermine even the best intentions. The Director will inevi-
tably be caught in the bind of having to meet competing and irreconcilable require-
ments when the Cabinet sponsors of the component missions of the HSTC demand 
their prioritization. The Director confronts a situation in which if he or she does not 
submit, the Cabinet head can cut off resources. If one Department is satisfied with 
the priorities, one of the others is likely not to be. When the Director’s home agency 
is involved, lack of satisfaction can impose a personal career penalty. 
A solution to this problem is for the HSTC Steering Group, as augmented by the 
DNI designee, to be chaired by a member of the staff of the Homeland Security 
Council (or National Security Council). The HSC/NSC staff role would be to ensure 
that the activities of the HSTC effectively transcend the sum of its parts and con-
tribute to the homeland security. This would allow full development of the terrorist 
travel facilitation, human trafficking, human smuggling, and general illicit travel 
missions. 
Assigning an HSC/NSC staff member to a chair position would permit more rapid 
build-up of the HSTC as it would allow for more rapid resolution of most conflicts. 
To the extent there are issues that require Cabinet-level attention, such as the an-
nual HSTC risk assessment, the HSC/NSC Steering Group chair is positioned to 
staff a Principals?-level meeting.
Personnel and Other Resources 
To fulfill its statutory missions, including supporting actions against terrorist 
travel facilitation, the HSTC requires sufficient personnel, access to all relevant in-
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formational pipelines, appropriate legal authorities, and adequate, consistent fund-
ing. 
The HSTC is a new entity that responds to the post-9/11 recognition that institu-
tional barriers must be dismantled to permit efficient collaboration in joint missions. 
This goal will not be achieved without a commensurate investment. 
Currently three Cabinet departments engage in negotiations to reimburse one bu-
reau for its support to the HSTC. While this was appropriate as a seed funding 
mechanism, the HSTC has been vulnerable to the vagaries of funding by its Charter 
sponsors. Therefore, the most important next legislative step is to place the HSTC 
on a secure funding base, with a specific authorization and appropriation. There are 
many possible ways to establish a permanent funding mechanism for the HSTC, but 
a core principle should be that HSTC be able to reimburse agencies for their costs 
in supporting the HSTC. 
There should also be career incentives, and at a minimum no disincentives, for 
working at the HSTC. Because the HSTC is quintessentially a joint mission with 
priorities that extend beyond those of home agencies, there is a risk that home 
agency managers will treat assignment to the HSTC as a disadvantage or marginal 
to career advancement. HSTC service should not pose a risk to careers and pref-
erably should represent an important step toward home agency leadership. 
At present, the goal should be to double the number of staff at the HSTC, with 
the foreseeable scale of staff required being on the order of 100 people, a number 
greater than ten times the current staffing level. Approximately a third of these 
should be intelligence analysts, with the remainder of operational personnel includ-
ing a mix of agents, attorneys, diplomats, border agents and inspectors, and immi-
gration fraud officers. There are approximately twenty agencies whose authorities 
and expertise make their participation in the HSTC essential to fulfill its fusion 
mission. 
Data systems and legal authorities also must be commensurate to the informa-
tional and operational support responsibilities of the HSTC. Like other homeland 
security functions, the HSTC will ultimately require more substantial office space.
CONCLUSION 
The gap between a realistic vision of what the US government must accomplish 
through the HSTC—reduce the vulnerability created by the terrorist and criminal 
groups that perpetuate and exploit illicit travel networks—and the support provided 
to the HSTC today is daunting. Congress should immediately move to close this gap. 
By developing shared information, supporting investigations, operations and other 
active countermeasures, and promoting working interagency and international part-
nerships, the HSTC can become a vital component of homeland security that will 
repay the US investment many times over in protecting against terrorist attacks, 
securing international travel channels, and upholding the rule of law.
Ms. HARRIS. I want to also state that Chairman Rogers has indi-
cated to the ranking member that this subcommittee will continue 
on its examination of this issue. 
And finally, after hearing the testimony, I was really encouraged 
when we originally created this Center. I was optimistic of the 
breakdown of the stovepipe of information and that this was going 
to be that interoperable sort of agency. 
I think in theory that is happening with the information. My con-
cern still remains if we are actually accomplishing those key issues 
for terrorist travel, sex trafficking and human smuggling in the 
field. I am concerned about the staffing issues, the funding issues, 
and the lack of maybe focused leadership in this arena because 
there is not that kind of accountability to make sure that the rub-
ber meets the road, that these things are being accomplished. 
But I sincerely want to thank the witnesses for their valuable 
testimony. I wish there were some more tangible things that re-
sulted from this hearing that we knew we could go do. We will con-
tinue on our quest. 
We will leave these issues open and the members of the com-
mittee may have additional questions for the witnesses, and we 
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will ask you to respond in writing. The hearing record will be open 
for 10 days. 
The committee stands adjourned. 
And once again thank you very much for your input. 
[Whereupon, at 3:25 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
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